Straight answer

Would we survive a ransomware attack?

Probably, but survival is the wrong test. The question is how many days of trading you would lose, and that depends on whether you can restore critical systems from backups the attacker could not reach, and whether you have rehearsed the decisions of the first days. The board can check both, so ask for the evidence.

How can the board tell whether it is under control?

Signs it is under control

  • Management can name the systems the business cannot run without, and how long each takes to restore.
  • A full restore from backup has been tested recently, and the result was reported to the board.
  • The board has taken part in an exercise and knows who decides what in the first 72 hours.

Signs it is not

  • The answer to “are we protected?” is a list of security tools.
  • Backups are tested for individual files, but nobody has restored a whole critical system.
  • The incident plan exists only on the network it is meant to help recover.

What is the one question to ask?

Ask at the next meeting

If our main systems were locked tomorrow, how long would it take to run the business again, and how do we know?

A strong answer

A time for each critical system, based on a recent restore test, with the gaps named and a plan and date to close them.

A weak answer

“We have strong defences and our backups are in place.”

What does surviving actually depend on?

Ransomware locks or steals your data and demands payment. Prevention matters, but no company can promise it will never be hit. The question for the board is what happens next. Can the business keep serving customers, perhaps by hand, for a few days? Can it restore its core systems from backups the attacker could not reach? Does it know who calls the insurer, the lawyers, the regulators and the customers, and who decides?

A company that has tested a full restore and rehearsed those decisions is in a very different position from one that has only bought good tools. The difference shows up in days of lost trading.

What might the board be getting wrong?

Boards often ask whether the company is secure, which invites reassurance rather than evidence. Some have also turned down the budget for a proper recovery test because it disrupts the business, then expected confidence about recovery. And many boards have never practised their own part: approving spend at short notice, agreeing what to tell the market, deciding about payment. If the board has not rehearsed, it is part of the gap.

What should the board ask for instead?

Ask for a short list of critical systems with a tested restore time for each, and the date of the test. Ask whether backups are kept somewhere an attacker with full network access could not reach. Ask for an exercise, at least once a year, that includes the board, and for the lessons to come back as actions with owners. Then ask, after each exercise, what has changed.

Where to go from here